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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
CODEWORD

ACTION
October 26, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: JOHN KNUBEL *JK*
SUBJECT: Follow-on Work to NSSM 171 on
Strategy and Forces for Asia

At the August meeting on NSSM 171, HAK asked for papers on Taiwan, Thailand, and Korean deployments. All but the Taiwan papers have been completed and submitted.

HAK also asked for "an analysis of Chinese escalatory capability over a ten-year framework" (see transcript at Tab A). Subsequent to the meeting, Phil decided to request this work verbally while the deployment studies were directed in a memo.

The analysis has been completed (apparently at Clements' direction) but the follow-up request has never been made. A call from you to BGeneral John Jones would suffice.

RECOMMENDATION

That you call BGeneral John Jones and request that the paper be transmitted.

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Classified by John Knubel

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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INFORMATION

August 1, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM:


Jeanne W. Davis *JWD*

SUBJECT:

Minutes of the DPRC Meeting held July 26, 1973
on U. S. Strategy in Asia (NSSM 171)

Attached are the minutes of the Defense Program Review Committee meeting held July 26, 1973 to discuss U. S. Strategy in Asia (NSSM 171).

Attachment

cc: Mr. Odeen 
Mr. Eagleburger
Mr. Kennedy

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would use nuclear weapons when they have them in the tens and we have them in the ten thousands.

Gen. Walters: Knowing the excellence of our intelligence, they wouldn't try.

Mr. Kissinger: We should do an analysis of Chinese escalatory capability over a ten-year framework.

Let's talk about force deployments. We have one division in Korea and two thirds of a division in Okinawa dedicated to NATO.

Mr. Odeen: It was earmarked for NATO at one time.

Adm. Weinell: That's ancient history.

Mr. Rush: We have 40,000 troops in Korea. How many are in the division?

Mr. Odeen: It's about half and half.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sneider) What would Japan do if the Chinese should attack?

Mr. Sneider: They would support the U.S. in terms of bases there. If the situation were desperate and Korea asked Japan to help, they would get involved. They couldn't afford not to.

Mr. Kissinger: That's my guess too.

Adm. Weinell: They would either let us use all their bases or none.

Mr. Sneider: If there were any attack on Korea, we might have to go through some form of consultation, but I think we could be using our bases in 15 or 20 minutes. There might be some local problems, but the Japanese would have too much at stake, particularly with a conservative government.

Mr. Kissinger: So we have an Army division in Korea, one Air-Wing each in Korea, the Philippines and Okinawa, and two-thirds of a Marine division in Okinawa. We have a separate problem on deployments on Taiwan and a separate problem on Thailand. On Korea and Okinawa, what is your judgment about deployment?

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